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Introduction
This chapter is about the struggle to consolidate democratic gains 
in Nigeria through citizen mobilization, following President Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s attempt to change the constitution in order to prolong his 
tenure in office for a third term. It examines the mobilization of an 
anti-third term camp, which was drawn from Nigeria’s parliament, 
civil society, opposition parties and the popular masses. In particular, 
we will focus closely on the role played by the 2007 Movement, a co-
alition of parliamentarians who formed the nucleus of the opposition 
to the tenure extension bid. This fierce battle for the soul of Nigeria’s 
democracy, which was openly fought by pro- and anti-third term groups 
between January 2005 and May 2006, was resolved when the National 
Assembly moved to throw out the Constitutional Amendment Bill, which 
(if passed) would have made Obasanjo’s tenure extension a reality.1 
This chapter is also about disagreements over the meaning of demo-
cracy. President Obasanjo had one definition of what constitutes de-
mocracy, which can be seen from the way members of his en tourage 
normally introduced him on public occasions – as the ‘founder of 
modern Nigeria’, with a ‘divine’2 will to combat corruption, streamline 
state institutions, introduce due process into economic governance, 
and send the country along the path of rapid economic development. 
So important was this mission to the president and his team that they 
believed themselves justified in using all possible mediating powers 
of the state to change the rules, so that they could continue in office. 
To them, democracy meant ‘good governance’, in the narrow sense 
of promoting accountability and due process. As such, they did not 
hesitate to participate in massive vote rigging in the 2003 and 2007 
elections, so that the ‘good governance’ team could continue its ‘good 
work’ (Transition Monitoring Group, 2007; Ibrahim, 2007).
Running counter to this notion of democracy was the version up-
held by Obasanjo’s opponents: it was linked to the preservation of 
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institutions and populist economic policies. By this understanding of 
democracy, respecting constitutional limits to terms of office was a 
necessary part of the democratic process in a country where crises of 
political succession have remained endemic. Consequently, contest-
ing the extension of the presidential term of office became part of 
the larger struggle against Obasanjo’s policies of public expenditure 
cuts (especially in health and education); massive retrenchment in the 
public services; constant increases in the price of petroleum products; 
and privatization of public enterprises. Throughout the eight years of 
Obasanjo’s presidency, civil society and labour groups organized strikes 
and public demonstrations against the steady rise in petroleum prices 
and the economic hardship. In short, many Nigerians had a concept 
of democracy that was diametrically opposed to that of Obasanjo and 
his team. Our study shows that, for many, the removal of the Obas-
anjo  regime became a sine qua non for the possibility of deepening 
democracy.
Nigeria’s political economy and the political context
Nigeria has an estimated population of 140 million, and is a federal 
democracy consisting of thirty-six states and a federal capital territory, 
further subdivided into 774 local governments. Prolonged military rule 
(for thirty out of the fifty years since independence) has had a consider-
able effect on party democracy and elections, eroding constitutional 
federalism through massive centralization of power and resources, 
violating the rights of citizens, rubbing away at the rule of law, and 
enshrining a culture of arbitrariness and impunity that has resulted in 
high levels of corruption. Military rule ended in 1999, and the return to 
democracy under the Fourth Republic was heralded by a new constitu-
tion. Obasanjo was the first president of this new era. 
Nigeria’s population comprises over 375 ethnic groups (Otite, 1990), 
almost equally split between Muslims and Christians; it has a literacy 
rate of less than 60 per cent. Although not constitutionally entrenched, 
the existing six geopolitical zones are well recognized as the basis for 
sharing power and promoting equity among the component parts of the 
federation.3 Nigeria’s plural and diverse ethnic, regional and religious 
character provides a key defining context for its electoral democracy. 
The ethnic groups that live in Nigeria vary in size, history and influence, 
and the tendency for the political elite to politicize and exploit these 
identities has led to an intense competition for state power and publicly 
controlled resources.
The politicization of ethnic and sectional identity has responded 
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dynamically to the changing character of federal politics and the shifting 
context of the struggle for power and resources. For instance, from the 
late colonial period to the end of the First Republic in 1966, ‘politics of 
difference’ played the three regions of the day – east, north and west 
– off against each other (each region coinciding with the interests of 
one of the three largest Nigerian ethnic groups). However, the feeling 
of oppression expressed by the ethnic minorities within these regions 
generated considerable social tension towards the end of colonial rule, 
and this survived into the post-independence era as demands for the 
creation of new states and local governments in the new Nigeria. 
A dominant feature of contemporary Nigerian politics remains the 
major role played by ethno-regional political organizations. Key expres-
sions of ethnic and regional platforms today include the Arewa Con-
sultative Forum (ACF) (representing the core north, which is, rather 
simplistically, identified as Hausa-Fulani), the Afenifere (the platform 
of the Yoruba-speaking population of the south-west) and the Ohaneze 
N’digbo (advancing the interests of the Ibo-speaking population in the 
south-east). There are other ethno-regional organizations that represent 
the various ethnic minorities, and these are useful in the mobilization 
of communal identity for electoral purposes. Against this background, 
and despite an increased liberalization of the political space, Nigerian 
political parties have remained fragile; their institutional weakness is a 
central challenge in establishing a healthy electoral democracy.4 The main 
reason for this weakness is the predominance of a core of practitioners 
within the political class: they came to the fore under successive military 
regimes, when there was an absence of internal democracy within party 
organizations and during a long period of decline in ideology- and issues-
based politics in parties and campaigns. The political parties are also 
weak in terms of democratic accountability, being answerable neither 
to their members nor to the Nigerian populace (despite the fact that 
they are publicly funded). 
The postcolonial path to economic development – and the role of 
the state within it – was heavily influenced by the colonial model. It was 
essentially defined by the following: a state-led approach to capitalist 
modernization; a dependent strategy, which emphasized a significant 
role for foreign capital; an import-substitution industrialization strategy; 
and a philosophy of development that excluded most ordinary people 
from meaningful participation in the development process.
The emergence of the petroleum economy in the 1970s, however, 
is what has had the most significant impact on the Nigerian politi-
cal economy. Between 1960 and 1964,  agriculture accounted for 79 
